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Profiteering Off Public Health Crises: 
The Viable Cure for Congressional 
Insider Trading 
Charles L. Slamowitz* 
Abstract 
This article takes an approachable, forward-thinking, and 
academic dive into congressional insider trading in the wake of 
the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. After a confidential 
briefing by the Senate Health Committee warned of COVID-19, 
massive stock sell-offs by members of Congress and their spouses 
suddenly ensued. Some senators even publicly disparaged 
COVID-19’s viral effects while their own shares were being 
offloaded. By the time the American people were made aware of 
its dangers, vast investment holdings by congressional insiders 
had already been sold. Shockingly, it is unclear if congressional 
insiders trading on confidential coronavirus information are 
actually breaking the law. Congress members are also not 
required to timely disclose trades, even during pandemics, 
leaving the American people in the dark. This article provides 
the only viable remedy to congressional insider trading, crucial 
for governmental transparency and accountability to 
precipitously curb public health crises moving forward. 
 
 * Counsel, Segal McCambridge Singer & Mahoney, Ltd.; J.D., Emory 
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of New York County; John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at 
Columbia University Law School; and Larry Kramer, former Dean of Stanford 
Law School. Many thanks to the Washington and Lee Law Review Online 
editorial staff for timely publishing this pivotal issue in unprecedented times. 
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I. Introduction 
In the wake of an impending global pandemic1 with 
momentous economic consequences,2 a confidential briefing by 
the Senate Health Committee warned of the novel coronavirus, 
SARS-CoV-2 (which leads to the disease called COVID-19).3 
Within days, massive stock sell-offs by members of Congress 
and their spouses ensued.4 Some senators even publicly 
downplayed COVID-19’s viral effects while their own shares 
were being offloaded.5 By the time the American people were 
 
 1. The World Health Organization (WHO) later declared COVID-19 a 
pandemic. WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on 
COVID-19—11 March 2020, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://
perma.cc/U22L-B6WB. 
 2. See WARWICK MCKIBBIN & ROSHEN FERNANDO, BROOKINGS INST., THE 
GLOBAL MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS OF COVID-19: SEVEN SCENARIOS 2 (2020), 
https://perma.cc/6269-NWM4 (PDF). The United States entered a recession in 
February according to National Bureau of Economic Research, as a direct 
result of COVID-19. See Jeanna Smialek, The U.S. Entered a Recession in 
February, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/29QE-MTT2. 
 3. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Edu., Lab. & 
Pensions, Senate Health Committee Announces Briefing to Update Senators 
on Coronavirus (Jan. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/N2DZ-GB9B. 
 4. See Sylvan Lane, Four Senators Sold Stocks Before Coronavirus 
Threat Crashed Market, THE HILL (Mar. 20, 2020, 8:47 AM), https://perma.cc
/VWG6-5JAH (last updated Mar. 20, 2020, 11:11 AM); Ed Lin, Nancy Pelosi’s 
Husband Bought Up Slack, Microsoft, and Alphabet Securities, BARRON’S (Apr. 
2, 2020, 12:47 PM), https://perma.cc/2VSS-RQU7. 
 5. See Robert Faturechi & Derek Willis, Senator Dumped Up to $1.7 
Million of Stock After Reassuring Public About Coronavirus Preparedness, 
PROPUBLICA (Mar. 19, 2020, 5:01 PM), https://perma.cc/ADS5-6X22 (last 
updated Mar. 25, 2020); Sen. Kelly Loeffler (@KLoeffler), TWITTER (Feb. 28, 
2020, 11:20 AM), https://perma.cc/882D-JDCG. 
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made aware of its dangers, vast investment holdings by 
congressional insiders had already been sold. 
Public health crises require the government and its 
agencies to take heightened remedial action6 by integrating 
transparent communication and accountability.7 But crises 
inherently offer opportunities for the government to abuse 
power or profiteer.8 Shockingly, congressional insiders trading 
on coronavirus information may not actually be breaking the 
law. Congresspersons are also not required to timely disclose 
these trades, even during pandemics, leaving the American 
people in the dark. However, promptly revealing the 
transactions is crucial for governmental transparency and 
accountability to effectively curb contagion.9 Is there a cure? 
 
 6. See generally Michael Olusegun Afolabi, Pandemic Influenza: A 
Comparative Ethical Approach, in 12 ADVANCING GLOBAL BIOETHICS 59 
(2018) (discussing government obligations to its citizens during public 
health crises); HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC 
INFLUENZA: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2006), https://perma.cc/5FFE-XJ98 (PDF) 
[hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION PLAN]; Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness 
and Advancing Innovation Act of 2019 (PAHPAI), Pub. L. No. 116–22, 113 
Stat. 905. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 201). 
 7. See Bruce Jennings & John D. Arras, Ethical Aspects of Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness and Response, in EMERGENCY ETHICS: PUBLIC 
HEALTH PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 1, 6 (Jennings et al. eds., 2016) (arguing 
emergency preparedness activities are to incorporate transparent and 
accountable decision-making processes); Toni G.L.A. van der Meer & Yan Jin, 
Seeking Formula for Misinformation Treatment in Public Health Crises: The 
Effects of Corrective Information Type and Source, 35 HEALTH COMM. 560, 
560–75 (2020) (stating governments are responsible for timely transparent 
information dissemination and in charge against misinformation); WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 41 (2009), 
https://perma.cc/J6QJ-NACE (PDF) (determining it is a necessity to maintain 
trust to the public through a commitment to transparency and credibility). 
 8. See Jennings & Arras, supra note 7, at 13 (“[E]thics and the law [in 
the U.S. and many other countries] have always recognized that rights and 
liberties can be temporarily overridden during an emergency situation when 
substantial harm to others is impending. Such temporary power has the 
potential for being extended in unjust ways and abused.”); see also GEORGE J. 
ANNAS ET AL., ACLU, PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS: THE NEED FOR A PUBLIC 
HEALTH—NOT A LAW ENFORCEMENT/NATIONAL SECURITY—APPROACH 23–24 
(2008), https://perma.cc/6QQK-NK6H (PDF) (stating scientific uncertainty in 
public health disasters tempt government officials to attempt some form of 
a cover-up). 
 9. See IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 6, at 16–17; van der Meer & 
Jin, supra note 7, at 560–61. 
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II. The Faulty Application of Insider Trading Laws to Congress 
While senior government officials were once required to 
disclose trades in a publicly-accessible electronic manner 
pursuant to the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act 
of 2012 (STOCK Act), this is no longer the case.10 In 2013, the 
STOCK Act was abruptly modified, repealing this 
requirement.11 However, a recent holding in United States v. 
Blaszczak,12 may conceivably thwart congressional insider 
trading on confidential government information 
altogether — like classified COVID-19 information from 
closed-door committee meetings. The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit upheld the United States Southern District of 
New York’s Blaszczak decision convicting four defendants for 
using pre-decisional medical reimbursement rate information 
from a government agency, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (CMS), to sell stocks for substantial returns.13 
Remarkably, the Court applied Title 18 securities fraud14 and 
wire fraud statutes,15 holding (A) confidential information held 
by the government can constitute “property” under these 
statutes; and (B) the “personal-benefit” test16 does not apply.17 
In light of Blaszczak, confidential COVID-19 information 
can be considered “property” under certain fraud statutes and 
 
 10. See STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112–105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012) (repealed 
2013). 
 11. Amendment S.716 to the STOCK Act repealed electronic filing 
disclosure requirements on April 15, 2013. See STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 
112 – 105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012) (repealed 2013); see also Dan Auble, Action 
Alert: STOCK Act Reversal Signed by President, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. 
(Apr. 15, 2013, 1:27 PM), https://perma.cc/X9NU-ZKD5 (reporting the STOCK 
Act’s removal of the requirements for online and electronic accessibility of 
disclosures). 
 12. 947 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 13. Id. at 45. 
 14. See 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2018) (codifying and detailing securities and 
commodities fraud). 
 15. See id. § 1343 (providing the elements of fraud by wire, radio, or 
television). 
 16. The “personal-benefit” test was established in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 
646, 661–64 (1983). 
  17.   Id. at 45. 
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its use can be prosecuted pursuant to misappropriation or 
embezzlement theories.18 A comparison between nonpublic 
COVID-19 government information and the nonpublic CMS 
government information in Blaszczak could undoubtedly be 
drawn. Further, the “personal-benefit” test, which has been 
historically difficult to demonstrate, is no longer required under 
certain fraud statutes.19 Under the “personal-benefit” test 
established in Dirks v. SEC,20 insiders are only convicted of 
securities fraud when proven they breached a duty of trust and 
confidence by disclosing material, nonpublic information for a 
“personal benefit.”21 Similarly, the one who traded on the 
information (the “Tipee”) can only be convicted of fraud when it 
is shown they utilized the inside information with knowledge 
that the tip had been obtained in breach of the insider’s duty.22 
The “personal-benefit” test has been altered drastically since 
Dirks by subsequent legal decisions, including Newman,23 
 
 18. The Blaszczak majority reasoned that its decision here aligns with 
the Supreme Court in Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987), which held 
that confidential pre-published Wall Street Journal information constitutes “property.” 
See Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 33 (“Here, we find it most significant that CMS 
possesses a ‘right to exclude’ that is comparable to the proprietary right 
recognized in Carpenter. Like the private news company in Carpenter, CMS 
has a ‘property right in keeping confidential and making exclusive use’ of its 
nonpublic predecisional information.”). 
 19. Blaszczak differentiated the Title 18 and wire fraud statues from the 
Title 15 fraud and 10-b5 statutes, with the former not applying to the 
“personal-benefit” test. Id. The Court in Carpenter found Title 18 was intended 
to provide broader enforcement mechanism to address securities fraud, and 
that wire fraud “includes the act of embezzlement, which is . . . the fraudulent 
appropriation to one’s own use of the money or property entrusted to one’s care 
by someone else.” See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27. 
 20. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 21. See id. at 663–667. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 447–49 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(reanalyzing the Dirks “personal-benefit” test and ruling that a tip and trade 
resembles a gift, but only with “proof of a meaningfully close personal 
relationship that generates an exchange that . . . represents at least a 
potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature” to the tipper). 
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Salman,24 and, more recently, Martoma II.25 Nevertheless, 
because Blaszczak effectively removed the onerous 
“personal-benefit” requirement for the Title 18 and wire fraud 
statutes altogether, insider trading cases could conceivably be 
brought with more regularity—including against Congress 
members trading on confidential COVID-19 information.26 
Still, the topical application of Blaszczak invites convincing 
counter-arguments by lawmakers. Significantly, the District 
Court in Blaszczak required the jury to find the material 
information at issue be knowingly and willfully 
“misappropriated” or “embezzled” by the defendants.27 Since one 
cannot misappropriate from oneself, this protects those who 
develop material information on their own.28 Thus, lawmakers 
involved in constructing the COVID-19 material could be 
exempt from the theory of misappropriation, which generates 
broad ramifications. Moreover, while the theory of 
embezzlement or conversion may be available, fraud cases that 
specifically concern government information are often difficult 
to demonstrate, as evidenced by conflicting circuit court 
opinions and the lack of legislative guidance.29 Lastly, Blaszczak 
 
 24. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016) (overruling 
Newman’s potential pecuniary-gain requirement of the personal-benefit test, 
holding it “inconsistent with Dirks,” while not expressly overruling Newman’s 
meaningfully close personal relationship aspect). 
 25. United States v. Martoma (Martoma II), 894 F.3d 64, 79 (2d Cir. 
2018) (holding the “personal-benefit” test may be proven through a gift, a 
relationship that suggests a quid pro quo, or an intention to benefit). The 
Court further held a “meaningfully close relationship” is not required when 
proving a quid pro quo or an intention to benefit. Id. 
 26. See John C. Coffee, A Short Primer on the New Law of Insider 
Trading, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 18, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://perma.cc/N7H8-FGWM; 
Mark D. Cahn et al., Better the Devil You Know? Tipping Liability, Martoma 
and the Rise of 18 U.S.C. § 1348, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 
2, 2019), https://perma.cc/QXC8-L4CU (“In light of . . . the lower bar presented 
by the elements of [Title 18], tipping charges under [Title 18] may become 
increasingly more common.”). 
 27. See Appendix at 1044–45, United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 (2d 
Cir. 2019) (Nos. 18-2811, 18-2825, 18-2867, 18-2878); see also Coffee, supra 
note 26 (determining District Judge Lewis Kaplan heroically 
placed significant limitations on the scope of § 1348). 
 28. See Coffee, supra note 26. 
 29. See United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 70–72 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(concluding 18 U.S.C. § 641 is proven through “knowingly converting” a “thing 
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contains a noteworthy dissent that considers information used 
by the government for regulatory purposes to not constitute 
“property” at all.30 Arguing that government COVID-19 
information is considered “regulatory” and not “property” could 
be judiciously contemplated. 
III. The Growing Uncertainty Plaguing Insider Trading Cases 
It is also important to note that insider trading cases have 
been plagued with uncertainty in recent years, casting doubt if 
Blaszczak will survive as controlling precedent.31 Indeed, 
“stealth overrulings” in insider trading cases now dominate 
these principally judicial constructs.32 The legal notion that 
cases subscribe to the doctrine of in pari materia, construction 
with reference all other applicable statutes, has been 
recurrently depreciated in insider trading cases, including 
Blaszczak.33 
 
of value”); Jessica Lutkenhaus, Prosecuting Leakers the Easy Way: 18 U.S.C. 
§ 64, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1169–79 (2014) (highlighting the ambiguity 
over whether Congress intended to prohibit theft and misuse of government 
information as a “thing of value” under 18 U.S.C. § 641). 
 30. Hon. Amalya L. Kearse dissented in Blaszczak, stating the CMS 
government information did not actually constitute “property,” see Cleveland 
v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 27 (2000) (holding Louisiana state video poker 
licenses were considered to be merely “regulatory” and not constitute 
“property”). Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 45–49 (Kearse, J., dissenting). 
 31. While it also remains to be seen if the Second Circuit Blaszczak 
decision will be adopted by other circuit courts, the Southern and Eastern 
Districts of New York are where most insider trading cases take place. See 
generally, e.g., Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 19; Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 64; 
Newman, 773 F.3d 438; Girard, 601 F.2d at 69. 
 32. See Recent Case, United States v. Martoma: Second Circuit Redefines 
Personal Benefit Requirement for Insider Trading, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1730, 
1730–37 (2019) (reasoning Martoma I and II were stealth reversals of Salman 
v. United States, which overruled Newman, that misstated Jiau, and 
reversed SEC v. Obus, which stealthily overruled Dirks). 
 33. See, e.g., Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 36 (determining that Congress 
indicated a contrary intent, so in pari materia does not apply: “Section 1348 
was added to the criminal code by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in large part 
to overcome the ‘technical legal requirements’ of the Title 15 fraud 
provisions.”). 
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An insider trading bill currently before the Senate, the 
Insider Trading Prohibition Act (H.R. 2534) (the “Act”)34—which 
already passed the House of Representatives by a significant 
margin—could inject more chronic uncertainty into the already 
complex insider trading laws. The Act proposes to reinstate the 
“personal-benefit” test in one subsection,35 which may preempt 
Blaszczak, while another subsection undermines the 
“personal-benefit” entirely by eliminating the requirement to 
prove a fiduciary breach for “misappropriation, or other 
unauthorized and deceptive taking of such information,”36 akin 
to Blaszczak. In light of recent rulings, certain subsections are 
at odds. In its current form, the Act’s drafting leaves much to be 
desired. Even the most connected insider would forgo betting on 
its practical consequences. 
Interestingly, however, the Act proposes to amend the 
Exchange Act of 1934,37 enforced by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).38 Amending the 1934 Act’s 
subsections to more clearly conform to the Blaszczak decision 
would further expand the SEC’s governance to have 
well-defined standing under Title 18 securities and other fraud 
statutes,39 to enact pandemic-specific congressional disclosure 
forms. Right now, the SEC’s standing is more clearly defined 
under the STOCK Act to show a violation of Rule 10b-5.40 But 
charges under the STOCK Act to members of Congress face a 
 
 34. This bill passed the House of Representatives on December 5, 2019, 
by a vote of 410 to 13. See Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 2534, 116th 
Cong. § 16A (2019). 
 35. See id. § 16A(c)(1)(D). Patrick McHenry (R-NC), Ranking Member of 
the House Financial Services Committee, reinstated this “personal-benefit” 
test back into the Act on the evening of the vote. Id. 
 36. See id. § 16AI(1)(C) 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 78a–78qq (2018). 
 38. The SEC, which was created by Section 78d of the Exchange Act of 
1934, enforces other legislation, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See 
The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE 
COMM’N (Oct. 1, 2013), https://perma.cc/87RU-E5UX. 
 39. See 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2018); John C. Coffee, The Senator Traded While 
His Constituents Died: A Legal Analysis of Insider Trading by Public Officials, 
COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG: CLS BLOG ON CORPS. AND THE CAP. MKTS. (Mar. 
31, 2020), https://perma.cc/T2RH-P394. 
 40. See Coffee, supra note 39. 
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myriad of legal and constitutional issues, including the Speech 
or Debate Clause in Article I of the U.S. Constitution,41 
interpreted by the Supreme Court as “anything generally done 
in a session of [Congress] by one of its members in relation to 
the business before it.”42 This prevents the obtainment of any 
documents or testimony reflecting those acts, which has 
previously encumbered the SEC.43 The modified STOCK Act 
also lacks the means to compel more immediate and 
publicly-accessible disclosures.44 
The STOCK Act has been recently asserted in a lawsuit 
against Senator Richard Burr (R-NC), the Chairman of the 
Senate Intelligence Committee, by a shareholder of Wyndham 
Resorts, one of the several companies where Burr offloaded 
shares.45 But until this lawsuit plays out, it remains to be seen 
if Senator Burr actually broke insider trading laws.46 The 
traditional route for prosecuting insider trading cases for 
 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1. 
 42. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311 (1973). 
 43. See Christian Garcia & John W.R. Murray, Insider Trading, Congress 
and COVID-19: A Renewed Focus on the STOCK Act, JDSUPRA (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/LUM3-HHEA (“Courts have held that the [Speech or 
Debate] Clause also prevents the government from obtaining documents or 
testimony reflecting those acts.” (citing SEC v. Comm. on Ways & Means of 
the U.S. House of Representatives, 161 F. Supp. 3d 199, 242–43 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015))). 
 44. See STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112–105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012) (repealed 
2013). 
 45. Jacqueline Thomsen, Browne George Ross Attorneys File First 
Lawsuit Over Sen. Richard Burr’s Coronavirus-Tied Stock Dumps, NAT’L L.J. 
(Mar. 24, 2020, 11:49 AM), https://perma.cc/4VRR-PXMT (stating the lawsuit 
was initiated by Alan Jacobson, a shareholder of Wyndham Hotels & Resorts). 
 46. Senator Burr is currently under investigation by the Department of 
Justice for potential criminal violations of these laws, while similar 
investigations into Senators Kelly Loeffler (R-GA), James Inhofe (R-OK), and 
Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) concluded in May with no charges being filed. Katie 
Benner & Nicholas Fando, Justice Dept. Ends Inquiries Into 3 Senators’ Stock 
Trades, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/NJ39-SXUR. After the 
FBI raided Senator Burr’s home on May 13, 2020, to seize his cellphone as 
part of the insider trading investigation, the senator “stepped aside” from his 
post as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Robert Faturechi & 
Derek Willis, Richard Burr Steps Down from Chairmanship of Senate 
Intelligence Committee, PROPUBLICA (May 14, 2020, 12:45 PM), https://
perma.cc/B3GG-H89Q. 
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members of Congress has been through classic insider trading 
laws, including by the Department of Justice (DOJ).47 Notably, 
the DOJ has opened and swiftly dropped investigations into 
Senators Kelly Loeffler (R-GA), James M. Inhofe (R-OK) and 
Dianne Feinstein (D-CA). Moreover, other members of Congress 
heavily involved in trading around COVID-19 were not 
investigated or named in lawsuits, such as Senator David 
Perdue (R-GA), who reportedly made a series of 112 stock 
transactions sold for around $825,000 and buying stocks worth 
$1.8 million, including a company directly involved in the 
provision of personal medical equipment, on the same day as the 
Senate briefing on March 2, 2020.48 Interestingly, Senator 
Perdue was also named to the President’s coronavirus task 
force.49 
While an investigation against Senator Burr did not 
entirely cease as of yet, many surmise this investigation is 
politically motivated and not necessarily grounded in the basis 
of insider trading laws for congressional members and for good 
reason. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the sole 
congressional insider trading investigation remaining against 
Senator Burr is political and not grounded in any established 
legal framework. The investigation of Burr’s trading is 
reportedly being handled by the Justice Department’s Public 
Integrity Section, along with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the 
District of Columbia, instead of the U.S. Attorney for the 
Southern District of New York’s office, which customarily works 
on high-profile insider trading cases, raising concerns that the 
investigation might not be handled competently or 
 
 47. See MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21127, 
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 1–13 (2016) (providing a detailed 
overview of the federal statutes related to insider trading, such as the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the STOCK Act, etc., along with seminal 
insider trading decisions). 
 48. Sheth Sonam, Sen. David Perdue Bought Stock in a Company that 
Produces Protective Medical Equipment the Same Day Senators Received a 
Classified Briefing on the Coronavirus, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 6, 2020, 6:25 PM), 
https://perma.cc/H9G6-5CUQ. 
 49. Tia Mitchell, Perdue, Loeffler to Advise Trump on Post-Pandemic 
Economy, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Apr. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/2VJV-3QHD. 
 
PROFITEERING OFF CRISES  41 
 
independently.50 Senator Burr has fallen out of favor with 
Present Trump and his constituents for investigating Russia’s 
interference in the 2016 presidential election, including issuing 
a subpoena to the president’s oldest son, Donald Trump, Jr., and 
the releasing of the investigation report in his position as 
Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.51 Notably, in a 
rare occurrence, more than one-thousand former DOJ 
employees accused Attorney General William Barr of political 
interference and demanded his resignation, along with 
testimony from a still-employed DOJ lawyer accusing the 
Attorney General of political interference and other allegations 
of political motivation.52 
Although former Representative Chris Collins of New York 
(R-NY) pled guilty in 2019 and was sentenced to twenty-six 
months in jail for violating insider trading charges under Rule 
10(b)(5) for telling relatives to sell biopharmaceutical shares, he 
obtained the nonpublic information by sitting on the company’s 
board, not through his governmental role.53 While stronger 
stances on insider trading on COVID-19 information have 
 
 50. Ankush Khardori, The Insider Trading Investigation of Richard Burr 
is in Terrible Hands, SLATE (May 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/2MEA-RLX2. See 
Sarah N. Lynch & Karen Freifeld, Manhattan Prosecutor Steps Down, Ending 
Stand-Off with Attorney General Barr, REUTERS (Jun. 20, 2020, 2:46 PM), 
https://perma.cc/Z9K5-9UW2 (reporting, interestingly, that the DOJ had 
Geoffrey Berman step down as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York after stand-off presumed related to investigating President Donald 
Trump’s personal lawyer, Rudolph “Rudy” Giuliani). 
 51. Anita Kumar, Don’t Expect Trumpworld to Rescue Richard Burr, 
POLITICO (May 14, 2020, 7:20 PM), https://perma.cc/SN7J-V772. Senator 
Marco Rubio (R-FL) has since been placed at the helm of the Committee as the 
acting chairman. Patricia Zengerle, Senator Rubio Chosen as Acting 
Intelligence Committee Chairman, REUTERS (May 18, 2020, 3:37 PM), https://
perma.cc/4LZY-NP68. 
 52. Jerry Lambe, 1,250-Plus Former DOJ Employees Call for 
Investigation of Bill Barr’s ‘Role in Ordering’ Use of Force Against Protestors, 
LAW & CRIME (Jun. 10, 2020, 3:47 PM), https://perma.cc/77AL-WMNV. 
 53. See Jonathan Allen, Former U.S. Congressman Collins Sentenced to 
26 Months for Insider Trading, REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2020, 6:07 AM), https://
perma.cc/33M6-6ECG. 
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recently been taken by the DOJ54 and SEC,55 these stances do 
not explicitly pertain to members of Congress. Nor does this 
retroactively remedy the bereft American people who were 
unaware of the drastic economic impact while Congress 
members’ shares were sold. Stronger stances alone are simply 
not enough here. But, it is a start. 
The United States Senate Select Committee on Ethics, 
which is vested with the power to oversee government insider 
trading, has been called to investigate including none other than 
Senator Burr.56 Remarkably, Senator Burr, already discovered 
withholding information from the public,57 asked the Ethics 
Committee to investigate, claiming he “relied solely on public 
reporting to guide [his] decision to sell the stock.”58 Burr 
co-sponsored the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and 
Advancing Innovation Act (PAHPAI),59 2019 legislation aimed 
to improve the nation’s preparation and response to natural and 
man-made public health threats.60 As a pandemic expert of the 
 
 54. See Memorandum from William Barr, Attorney General, for All 
United States Attorneys 2 (Mar. 16, 2020) (“Every U.S. Attorney’s Office is 
thus hereby directed to prioritize the detection, investigation, and prosecution 
of all criminal conduct related to the current pandemic.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee law Review). 
 55. Stephanie Avakian & Steven Peikin, Statement from Stephanie 
Avakian and Steven Peikin, Co-Directors of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, 
Regarding Market Integrity U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, U.S. 
SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMM’N (Mar. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/YVC6-CDMD. 
 56. Eric Lipton et al., Stock Sales by Senator Richard Burr Ignite Political 
Uproar, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/Z3ZX-8T6F (last updated 
Mar. 21, 2020); Letter from Daniel Schuman, Pol’y Dir., Demand Progress, to 
Honorable James Lankford & Honorable Christopher Coons, U.S. Senate 
Select Committee on Ethics (Mar. 20, 2020) (requesting an investigation into 
Senator Richard Burr) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 57. See Tim Mak, Weeks Before Virus Panic, Intelligence Chairman 
Privately Raised Alarm, Sold Stocks, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 19, 2020, 5:08 
AM), https://perma.cc/2HFA-XDGE (publishing a recording of Senator Burr 
warning a group of constituents of the pandemic: “Luckily, we have a 
framework in place that has put us in a better position than any other country 
to respond to a public health threat, like the coronavirus.”). 
 58. Letter from Richard Burr, U.S. Senator, North Carolina, to Honorable 
James Lankford & Honorable Christopher Coons, U.S. Senate Select 
Committee on Ethics (Mar. 20, 2020). 
 59. Pub. L. No. 116–22, 113 Stat. 905 (2019). 
 60. Id. 
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Senate, Burr certainly appreciated that the confidential 
COVID-19 information he obtained was material. The fact that 
Burr is requesting an Ethics Committee investigation 
elucidates the significantly muddled distinction between public 
and nonpublic information for the purposes of congressional 
insider trading. 
Indeed, guidance from the Senate Ethics Committee on the 
STOCK Act’s insider trading prohibition acknowledges how 
common detecting nonpublic information in the Senate can be: 
“[W]hile Senators and staff are prohibited from using nonpublic 
information for making a trade, a great deal of Congressional 
work is conducted on the public record or in the public realm 
during committee hearings and markups, floor activity, and 
speeches.”61 
The Committee on Ethics disclosed an important issue 
here—it is hard to determine if lawmakers get their information 
in a nonpublic briefing or in public proceedings. In Senator 
Burr’s case, he claimed that the public market guided his 
decisions.62 Further, closed-door meetings may use information 
obtained from publicly-disclosed global sources, making actual 
violations difficult to verify. The Ethics Committee also does not 
have a broad-based predictable framework or enforcement 
mechanism, nor does it facilitate immediate and 
easily-accessible trading disclosures to the public. Thus, 
expecting wide-spread, demarcated, and pandemic-specific 
congressional oversight by the Ethics Committee as a practical 
solution is implausible.  
A more drastic position—that members of Congress be 
prohibited from trading altogether—is becoming more widely 
held, a view shared by some members of Congress and a former 
drafter of the STOCK Act.63 Congress members Raja 
Krishnamoorthi (D-IL), Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), and 
Joe Neguse (D-CO) have proposed reintroducing the Ban 
 
 61. See Memorandum from the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Ethics 
to All U.S. Senators (Dec. 4, 2012) (providing guidance on restrictions on 
insider trading under securities laws and ethics rules) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 62. Letter from Richard Burr, supra note 58. 
 63. See Tyler Gellasch, I Helped Write the STOCK Act. It Didn’t Go Far 
Enough, POLITICO (Mar. 25, 2020, 3:50 PM), https://perma.cc/TAN3-CFYQ. 
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Conflicted Trading Act (S. 1393)64 (the “Bill”), initially 
introduced by Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR) in May 2019. The 
Bill proposes barring members of Congress, along with their 
senior staff, from buying or selling individual stocks or other 
investments while in office, among other requirements and 
prohibitions.65 The individual holdings would need to be 
liquidated within six months of the Bill’s enactment, and new 
members of Congress would have six months to sell from when 
they join, or else, the investments must be transferred to a blind 
trust or held throughout their entire tenure in office.66 The 
ambitious legislation overseeing Congress members and their 
senior staff may be regarded as overbearing, extreme, or 
political Democratic partisanship without additional support, 
rendering it unpassable. Compromise and political conciliation 
would undoubtedly need to be attained. 
Shockingly, Senator Kelly Loeffler (R-GA), who has been 
accused of insider trading on COVID-19 information,67 recently 
pledged to liquidate all of her stock options due to public 
backlash, while contending that she did nothing wrong.68 But 
Loeffler may be an outlier since she was appointed to President 
Trump’s coronavirus task force on reopening America and is 
running for special election in a hotly contested Senate race.69 
On the other hand, several other members of Congress accused 
of insider trading have not conceded to selling their shares, 
 
 64. Ban Conflicted Trading Act, S. 1393, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 65. See Press Release, U.S. Congressman Raja Krishnamoorthi, 
Representatives Krishnamoorthi, Ocasio-Cortez, and Neguse to Introduce 
Legislation to Prohibit Government Officials from Profiting Off Their 
Positions by Trading Stocks (Mar. 23, 2020) (summarizing how the Act would 
also prevent House members from serving on corporate boards, like the 
Senate) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The Bill was 
originally introduced as the Ban Conflicted Trading Act. S. 1393, 116th Cong. 
(2019). 
 66. Ban Conflicted Trading Act, §§ 2–6. 
 67. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 68. See Kelly Loeffler, I Never Traded on Confidential Coronavirus 
Information, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8, 2020, 12:57 PM), https://perma.cc/L77Q-
555W. 
 69. See Dave Goldiner, ‘Insider Trading’ Senator Named to Trump’s 
‘Reopen America’ Coronavirus Task Force, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/9TPN-TEEX. 
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including Senator Burr, despite many calling for his resignation 
(pursuant to recent developments, he would now be succeeded 
only by someone from his own party if leaving office before his 
term expires).70 
IV. Curing Congressional Insider Trading 
In its current state, the legitimacy of whether members of 
Congress trading on nonpublic COVID-19 information will be 
successfully prosecuted for insider trading remains unknown. 
More significantly, the present measures available fall short of 
enforcing essential government transparency and 
accountability by government during pandemics. But there is a 
cure: enact timely heightened pandemic-specific securities 
disclosure requirements for members of Congress in an easily 
publicly-accessible manner. 
Since public health crises inherently offer opportunities for 
governments to abuse power or profiteer,71 codifying 
pandemic-specific requirements is that much more significant. 
Indeed, curtailing congressional insider trading during public 
health crises is already ensconced in our ethical and 
constitutional frameworks.72 Importantly, enacting heightened 
disclosure requirements that are limited to public health crises 
also outweighs countervailing national security concerns. It is, 
indeed, a more sensible solution than prosecuting all 
congresspersons alleged of insider trading, barring them from 
owning any securities, or doing nothing. By enacting 
pandemic-specific congressional disclosure requirements, a 
more transparent and accountable government narrative 
emerges. Its implementation is the next step. 
Enacting timely heightened congressional disclosure 
requirements can be accomplished through amending the 
Insider Trading Prohibition Act, legislation already pending 
 
 70. See Emily Singer, GOP Rigged Rules to Ensure Only a Republican 
Can Replace Burr, THE NAT’L MEMO (Mar. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/5JK5-
4CD5. 
 71. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
 72. The U.S. Government is allotted a large latitude of powers and 
responsibility for pandemics. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text; see, 
e.g., Pandemic Flu—Public Health Research Guide, GEO. L. LIBR., https://
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before the Senate. Clarifying that “property” includes 
government information, and that the “personal-benefit” test is 
not required for certain fraud statutes like misappropriation, 
embezzlement, or conversion, modeling Blaszczak, would 
deliver the requisite modifications. Adjusting the reintroduced 
Ban Conflicted Trading Act to include these provisions could 
also work. Or, a new bill can be introduced entirely. 
Alternatively, members of Congress could do the unthinkable: 
timely and publicly disclose the information themselves. But all 
jokes aside, by incorporating veritable legislation of 
pandemic-specific congressional securities disclosures, our 
agencies will make the enactment a reality. This way, the 
American people—through the economy and media—have the 
opportunity to recognize the true impact that the next pandemic 
might have. Before it is too late. 
The profound impact of COVID-19 is irrefutably changing 
our country and our world. A more transparent and accountable 
government to counteract public health crises has never been 
more essential. Enacting pandemic-specific congressional 
disclosure requirements is the cure. 
 
